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The sources of law in most African countries are customary law, the
common law and legislation both colonial and post-independence. In a
typical African country, the great majority of the people conduct their
personal activities in accordance with and subject to customary law.
Customary law has great impact in the area of personal law in regard to
matters such as marriage, inheritance and traditional authority, and
because it developed in an era dominated by patriarchy some of its
norms conflict with human rights norms guaranteeing equality between
men and women. While recognizing the role of legislation in reform, it is
argued that the courts have an important role to play in ensuring that
customary law is reformed and developed to ensure that it conforms to
human rights norms and contributes to the promotion of equality
between men and women. The guiding principle should be that
customary law is living law and cannot therefore be static. It must be
interpreted to take account of the lived experiences of the people it serves.
INTRODUCTION
The national legal system of a typical African state is pluralistic and
composed of the following sources African customary law: religious laws
(especially where there is a significant Muslim population); received law
(common law or civil law depending on the colonial history)'; and
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1. The common law was introduced by the English Law (Extent of Application) Act.
English Law (Extent of Application) Act, Cap. 11, 2 LAws OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2002) § 2.
The problem is with the manner in which it was introduced in that it raises many
questions: what law, relevance. See W.L. Church, The Common Law and Zambia, 6
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legislation, both colonial (adopted from the colonial state) and post-
independence legislation enacted by Parliament. Customary law is the
indigenous law of the various ethnic groups of Africa. The pre-colonial
law in most African states was essentially customary in character,
having its sources in the practices and customs of the people. In a
typical African country, the great majority of people conduct their
personal activities in accordance with and subject to customary law. It
should be appreciated that the use of the term "African customary law"
does not indicate that there is a single uniform set of customs prevailing
in any given country. Rather, it is used as a blanket description covering
many different legal systems. These systems are largely ethnic in origin,
and they usually operate only within the area occupied by the ethnic
group and cover disputes in which at least one of the parties to the
dispute is a member of the ethnic group. There are local variations
within such areas, but, by and large, the broad principles in all the
various systems are the same. There is broad agreement that in its
present form customary law is distorted. The sources of customary law
that are historically and presently accepted as authoritative are a
product of social conditions and political motivations. It is influenced by
the recent interaction between African custom and colonial rule. In
Alexkor Limited v. Richtersveld Community, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa observed that "although a number of text books exist and
there is a considerable body of precedent, courts today have to bear in
mind the extent to which indigenous law in the pre-democratic period
was influenced by the political, administrative and judicial context in
which it was applied."2
Customary law has a great impact on the lives of the majority of
Africans in the area of personal law in regard to matters such as
marriage, inheritance, and traditional authority.3 In its application,
customary law is often discriminatory in such areas as bride price,
ZAMBIA L.J. 1 (1974); ANTONY ALLOTT, NEW ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 21-27 (1970) (noting
statutory provisions based on common law in numerous countries).
2. Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty., 2003 (5) SA 460 (CC) n.51 (S. Afr.) (explaining
T.W. BENNETT, A SOURCEBOOK OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA
(1991)); see also T.W. Bennett, The Compatibility of African Customary Law and Human
Rights, 1991 AcTA JURIDICA 18, 18-35 (discussing the role of customary law in South
African legal reform).
3. In the case of Zambia, an AFRONET study concluded that "[o]f the five rungs of the
judicial power in Zambia, comprising the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Industrial
Relations Court, the Subordinate Courts and the Local Courts, it is the latter which play
an important part in the settlement of disputes of the majority of the population."
AFRONET, THE DILEMMA OF LOCAL COURTS IN ZAMBIA 1 (1998), http://www.vanuatu.usp.
ac.fillibrary/OnlinefUSP%200nly/Customary%20LawlDilemna.htm [hereinafter DILEMMA
OF LocAL CouRTs].
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guardianship, inheritance, appointment to traditional offices, exercise of
traditional authority, and age of majority. It tends to see women as
adjuncts to the group to which they belong, such as a clan or tribe,
rather than equals. There is a major debate between human rights
activists and traditionalists centered on whether customary norms are
compatible with human rights norms contained in international
conventions and national bills of rights in national constitutions. 4 While
traditionalists argue that, by promoting traditional values, customary
law makes a positive contribution to the promotion of human rights,
activists argue that certain customary law norms undermine the dignity
of women and are used to justify treating women as second class
citizens. Many African constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing
equality, human dignity, and prohibiting discrimination based on
gender. However, the same constitutions recognize the application of
customary law and they do this without resolving the conflict between
customary law norms and human rights provisions. Using Zambia's
Constitution as an example, a typical constitution provision limits the
application of provisions outlawing discrimination by providing that
such provisions
shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes
provision:
(a) for the appropriation of the general revenues of the
Republic;
(b) with respect to persons who are not citizens of Zambia;
(c) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial,
devolution of property on death or other matters of
personal law;
(d) for the application in the case of members of a
particular race or tribe, of customary law with respect to
any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to
that matter which is applicable in the case of other
persons ... .
4. See, e.g., Lea Mwambene, Marriage Under African Customary Law in the Face of
the Bill of Rights and International Human Rights Standards in Malawi, 10 AFR. HUM.
RTS. L.J. 78, 82 (2010).
5. CONST. OF ZAMBIA OF 1991, art. 23.
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This article examines the place of African customary law in an
African legal system, and tensions that exist between African customary
law and both domestic and international human rights norms. It is
important to evaluate customary norms in the context of human rights
because legal norms capture and reinforce deep cultural norms and
community practices. Customary norms entrench ideas and help give
them the sense of being natural and part of the way things are or should
be. While African customary law emphasizes rights in the context of the
community and kinship rights and duties of individuals to their
communities, human rights norms typically enjoin state parties to
treaties to respect human rights and take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women.6 Human rights norms proceed
on the basis that women's rights under international conventions are
universal norms to which all countries must adhere,7 women are
entitled to the exercise of their human rights, and fundamental rights
and fundamental freedoms within the family and society. Human rights
norms also proceed on the basis that the protection of the family as a
social unit should not be used to justify restrictions on the individual
rights of family members. The difference in approach has resulted in
clashes between customary law norms on one side, and internationally
protected human rights norms and national bills of rights inspired by
international norms on the other. As B. A. Rwezaura has observed, the
opposition to change is based on an ideology that characterizes attempts
at reforming customary law as contrary to African traditions and
culture and an attempt to westernize African society.8 Such opposition
is often a political reaction to the colonial imposition of the common law
6. See generally United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, G.A. Res. 34/180
[hereinafter CEDAW] (stating in Article 2, "State Parties condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a
policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: (a) To
embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or
other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law
and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle; (b) to adopt
appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate,
prohibiting all discrimination against women; . . . (e) To take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise; .... ).
7. MARSHA A. FREEMAN, INT'L WOMEN'S RTs. ACTION WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
FAMILY: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION, ARTICLES 9, 15 AND 16 OF
THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN 1 (1993).
8. B. A. Rwezaura, Traditionalism and Law Reform in Africa 539 (Jan. 28, 1983)
(paper presented at a seminar jointly arranged by the Fundamental Rights and Personal
Law Research Project, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, and the Department of Law,
University of Zimbabwe) (on file with author).
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on African states and an effort to assert African dignity. In such a
context, efforts to reform customary law can easily be interpreted as an
effort to impose Western values on African societies. In defense of
customary law, Cobbah exemplifies this reaction. He states that
It is my contention that to correct injustices within
different cultural systems of the world it is not necessary
to turn all people into Westerners. Western liberalism
with its prescription of human rights has had a
worthwhile effect not only on Westerners but on many
peoples of this world. It is, however, by no means the
only rational way of living human life. . . . Instead of
imposing the Western philosophy of human rights on all
cultures one's effort should be directed to searching out
homeomorphic equivalents in different cultures. In other
words, we should understand that homeomorphism is
not the same as equivalence and strive to discover
peculiar functional equivalence in different cultures.9
This reaction to efforts at reforming African customary law is often
accompanied by an almost religious exhalation of the virtues of the
traditional system of law. While it is imperative that we draw attention
to the fact that most Western understandings of African customary law
are influenced by their negative attitudes towards all things African, it
is important to realize that African theory and practice have been
influenced and have become part of the global movement for the
globalization of human rights. By enthusiastically joining international
human rights instruments and adopting their own African instruments
such as the African Human and People Rights Charter10 and the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa," African states are embracing the
international human rights movement and its universality.
The context and the implications for vulnerable groups are always
going to be important in the interpretation of rights. As Eze has
observed, "[tihe categories of rights protected as well as their scope, and
ultimately who enjoys any of these rights, are in the end determined by
9. Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African
Perspective, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 309, 328-29 (1987).
10. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB[LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].
11. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, adopted July 11, 2003, AHG/Res.240 (XXXI).
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the nature and character of society that is being examined."12 Much has
changed in African societies since the advent of colonialism. The process
of industrialization is widely associated with movements from rural
areas to urban centers.13 The fact that African customary law is
changing in response to urbanization, interethnic marriages, and
education is not a phenomenon peculiar to Africa. For example, it is well
known that the impact of industrialization in Europe changed the
nature of the family as a social institution beyond all recognition. 14 The
earlier forms of the family exhibited quite complicated kinship patterns
similar to those of African families.15 A fundamental question arises as
to whether the continued application of customary norms that
discriminate against women can be justified with reference to any set of
prevailing social norms or traditions or cultural standards.
The place of African customary law in African legal systems can be
divided into three approaches. The first approach can be termed the
historical approach. This was the approach adopted during colonial rule.
The second approach is that adopted by new constitutions in the
postindependence era, and the third is the approach in the
postdemocratization era. This article will describe these three
approaches in relation to the status of customary law and their impact
on women's rights. In any effort to advance human rights, the courts
play a crucial role. Therefore, this article will examine the role of the
courts in the implementation of African customary law and the reaction
of courts to African customary law norms that discriminate against
women. While recognizing the important role legislation can play in law
reform, this article argues that the fight for gender equality needs to
move to the courts and mass movements. The challenge is how to ensure
that courts interpret the law in such a way that gender equality is
advanced. This will require social movements to put pressure on the
courts and society to act in the interests of gender equality. This
suggests that we need to improve access to courts so that women can
bring claims based on discrimination, thereby giving opportunities to
the courts to reform the law. One way of encouraging the courts to
interpret customary law in accordance with human rights norms is to
show that the traditional social and economic relations on which the
customary norms that discriminate against women are founded, and on
which traditionalists rely to oppose reform, have in reality been
12. OSITA C. EZE, HumAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 30
(Empowerment & Action Research Centre, Annual Lecture, Series No. 4, 1998).
13. Muna Ndulo, The Changing Nature of Customary Marriage in Zambia, in LAW IN
ZAMBIA 143, 153 (Muna Ndulo ed., 1984).
14. See id.
15. Id.
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radically transformed. This will enable us to show that the values used
by traditionalists to support customary legal norms that discriminate
against women are no longer practiced in their existing form by
communities. For example, Rwezaura has made a strong criticism of the
institution of bride wealth 6 based on the changed social and economic
relations prevailing today.'7 He has observed that "payment of bride
wealth was not an individualized affair. It was a matter for the concern
of a wider family."18 He adds that
[t]he system of mutual assistance in bridewealth
transfers was part of a wider economic interdependence
and kinship solidarity which obtained in many African
societies during the pre-capitalist era. But this economic
interdependence and kinship solidarity was based upon
a number of other relationships. Agriculture was
undertaken by mutual aid teams, and so was livestock
husbandry. Children, being so dependent on the elders
for their marriage cattle, worked very hard for their
fathers and were obedient to them. In return the fathers
assisted their sons to establish their own families. They
also paid fines and damages in respect of their sons'
wrongs.19
The practice is now characterized by high demands of money as bride
wealth. The rapid rise of the quantity of bride wealth can only be
explained by the distortion of the custom. 20 It has become what
Westerners alleged was a bride price21 and has ceased to be a source of
African pride, as it has become an institution that is characterized by
the domination and exploitation of women.
16. Rwezaura's use of the term "bride wealth" is synonymous with the term "bride
price."
17. Rwezaura, supra note 8, at 553-54.
18. Id. at 548.
19. Id. at 548-49.
20. Id. at 552. Aeneas Chigwedere has shown how bride wealth, which served certain
traditional functions in a particular community in Zimbabwe, has been turned "upside-
down." Id. "He cites the example of a small payment known as mapfukuzda dumba
(literary [sic] meaning to distort the womb) which was given to the mother-in-law as
compensation for the distortion of her womb. The argument for the payment was that 'the
mother-in-law was shapely before her first pregnancy which gave birth to the daughter
now being married.'. . . In contemporary Zimbabwe the mapfukuzda dumbu has taken a
new form. In addition to rising in quantity, it is now being claimed by both the mother-in-
law and the father-in-law and it is also claimed in respect of all daughters including the
last born." Id.
21. Ndulo, supra note 13, at 149-50.
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I. THE COLONIAL PERIOD: THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW
The precolonial law in most African states was essentially
customary law in character, having its source in the practices,
traditions, and customs of the people. The normative force and
legitimacy of customary law is derived from the idea that it is ancient,
unchanging and passed on from generation to generation, and that it is
part and parcel of people's identity and culture. The colonial
administrations recognized customary law and its institutions, although
its application was generally restricted to Africans. From its inception
the system of administration of justice introduced by the British
differentiated between the Europeans and Africans. For example, in
Zambia, section 14 of the Royal Charter of Incorporation on October 29,
1889, authorized this differentiation as it entrusted the administration
of Rhodesia to the British South African Company.22 It stated, "In the
administration of justice to the said peoples or inhabitants, careful
regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe
or nation . . . ."23 Native Courts administered customary law. Typically
the governor of a territory had exclusive right to establish native courts.
He also had exclusive right to determine who sat in the native courts
and to suspend or terminate the appointment of justices. The courts had
jurisdiction over trials and determinations of any civil cause or matter
in which both the parties were Africans. The practice and procedure was
regulated in accordance with customary law. The native courts were
subject to review by District Officers. This led to what is termed the
"bastardization" of African customary law. Human rights protections
did not arise in the colonial period, as colonialism itself was premised on
the violation of human rights. The common law and legislation was and
still is administered by an English style judicial system. Practice and
procedure in these courts has always been in substantial conformity
with the law and practice observed in English courts. 24 This meant
distinct judicial systems with no connecting link at any level of the
judicial hierarchy.
At independence many African countries instituted judicial reforms
which attempted to deal with two things: (1) integration of the court
system and (2) the removal of racial bias in the administration of
22. Charter of the British South Africa Company (Oct. 29, 1889), in SELECT
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY, 1795-1910, at 559
(George von Welfing Eybers ed., 1918).
23. Id. at 562.
24. High Court Act of 1960, Cap. 27, 3 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (1997) § 9.
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justice.25 In most African countries, English or French systems of courts
served as models for a full range of African courts: e.g., supreme courts,
high courts, and subordinate courts. These courts have the same
jurisdiction as similar common law courts elsewhere. At the bottom of
these courts, African countries created a fourth tier. The names vary
from country to country, but they include primary courts, community
courts, and local courts. The local courts serve as the courts of first
instance in matters involving customary law. 26 Appeals from these
courts go to the subordinate courts, then to a high court, and finally to a
supreme court.
From the inception of colonial rule, customary law was applicable on
two conditions: (1) that it was not repugnant to justice, equity, or good
morality and (2) that it was neither in its terms nor by necessary
implication in conflict with any written law. 27 The application of the
repugnancy clause has always been a source of controversy. It was
observed that subjecting African customary law to a repugnancy clause
and the clause being applied to African customary law by English
colonial judges meant two things: (1) that customary law was inferior to
the common law and (2) that the standard by which the validity of
African customary law was to be determined was inevitably to be that
set up by English ideas of legal norms, justice, and morality. And yet
the values of Western society are embedded in the common law, even as
values of traditional African society are embedded in African customary
law. These are two different systems of law developed in two different
situations under different cultures and in response to different
conditions. In addition to the conflict of cultural values, apparent
inconsistency in the application of the repugnancy clauses created
problems. As can be seen from the examples of the cases Agbede gives in
his book Legal Pluralism, the inconsistency created by an ad hoc
approach to repugnancy clauses does not promote justice and reveals
the need for sound principles as rules of guidance for the judges in the
various departments of the substantive law to achieve certainty and
predictability and promote the course of justice.28
There are a number of cases that declared aspects of customary law
repugnant to justice and morality that illustrate the inconsistency.
Examples of customs that were declared repugnant include woman-to-
25. See Earl L. Hoover et al., The Evolution of the Zambian Courts System, in LAW IN
ZAMBIA, supra note 13, at 47, 55-56.
26. Roger Purdy, The Zambian Judicial System: A Review of the Jurisdictional Law, in
LAW IN ZAMBIA, supra note 13, at 67, 67; Hoover et al., supra note 25, at 47-66 (discussing
the history of the Local Court system in Zambia).
27. ALLOrr, supra note 1, at 158-81.
28. 1. OLUWOLE AGBEDE, LEGAL PLURALISM 71 (1991).
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woman marriage, 29 liability of the family for wrongs committed by one
of its members, and paternity rules.30 Ironically it would seem that
courts struck down provisions that empowered women and were
contrary to the Victorian views as to the role of women in society. Many
of today's contentious issues such as polygamy and discriminatory
inheritance practices were left untouched. As in other, dual systems of
law, there are many problems associated with duality. The coexistence
of common law and customary law in the same country raises the
problem of when the laws apply and to whom. As Opoku has observed,
"As can be imagined, such a division of areas of competence, in the
colonial context, was more than a simple mechanical or technical
division of labour. It involved all kinds of assumptions and value
judgments."3' "In discussing law under the colonial regime, it is usual to
contrast the French policy of 'direct rule' with the British policy of
'indirect rule."'3 2 In fact, the two approaches were not different in effect
as both relegated customary law to an "inferior position."33 Because the
different laws were administered by different courts, the resulting
problem is not limited to conflict of jurisdiction rules, but also includes
the divergence in the quality of justice attainable in the various systems
of courts.34 This is because of the different rules of procedure and the
marked differences in the quality of judicial personnel.35 In addition, in
most cases men often staff the local courts, and the men are chosen for
their familiarities with customary norms.36 Such men are more inclined
to defend what they see as traditional norms than the living law of
communities.
In postindependence constitutions elaborated before the era of
democratizations in the 1980s, the independent African states continued
to recognize customary law together with the common law and
29. AGBEDE, supra note 28, at 57-96; C.O. Akpamgbo, A 'Woman to Woman" Marriage
and the Repugnancy Clause: A Case of Putting New Wine into Old Bottles, 14 AFR. L.
STUD. 87, 87-92 (1977).
30. ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 166-72.
31. KWAME OPoKu, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE IN GHANA A STUDY OF LEGAL PLURALISM 2
(1976).
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id.
34. See DILEMMA OF LOCAL COURTS, supra note 3. The Report concludes, "This survey
demonstrates the dilemma of the Local Courts in Zambia. Customary law itself remains in
a state of flux. The degree of neglect by the government of the infrastructure of the Local
Courts is disappointing. The much talked about autonomy of the judicature remains a
myth. Concentration of resources and decision making is still a preserve of the central
administration in Lusaka. There is a total absence of moral and material incentives for
the judicial and support staff at the Local Court level."
35. Id.
36. Id.
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legislation as a source law. The court system was integrated. This was
done by putting the local courts (the courts that dealt with customary
law) at the bottom of the judicial structure. Unfortunately, the
postcolonial constitutions in this period left much to be desired on the
issue of women's rights. The independence and new constitutions of the
1960s contained bills of rights that guaranteed human rights to all on
the basis of equality between men and women and, at the same time,
immunized customary law against human rights scrutiny. For example,
the Zimbabwe Constitution provides that "no person shall be treated in
a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written
law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any
public authority"37 and that "no law shall make any provision that is
discriminatory either of itself or in its effect." 38 It then states that
[n]othing contained in any law shall be held to be in
contravention of subsection (1)(a) to the extent that the
law in question relates to any of the following matters-
(a) matters of personal law; (b) the application of African
customary law in any case involving Africans or an
African and one or more persons who are not Africans
where such persons have consented to the application of
African customary law ... 39
There are many aspects of customary law that are good and need to
be preserved. For example, it has no institutionalized or complicated
procedures, and the objective of dispute settlement is reconciliation.
This underpins many of its procedures. 40 In terms of the future, there is
need to create one legal system which takes into account both the
received law and the customary law. In a unified system the good values
of customary law, such as the simplicity of procedures and the
preference for reconciliation rather than litigation, should be reflected
in the integrated legal system. Unless customary law is integrated it is
bound to die or be relegated to the law of the poor. We must always
remember that the function of law is to meet the needs of the society it
serves.
37. CONST., art. 23 (1)(a) (2009) (Zim.).
38. Id. art. 23 (1)(b).
39. Id.
40. See VERNON V. PALMER & SEBASTIAN M. POULTER, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF LESOTHO
99-167 (1972).
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II. EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE IN THE ERA OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In postdemocratization constitutions, the status of customary law in
most African jurisdictions is constitutionally protected. It is part of the
general law of the country. For example, Section 211 of the Constitution
of South Africa provides that the institution, status, and role of
traditional leadership are recognized subject to the constitution.41 It
further states that a "traditional authority that observes a system of
customary law may function subject to any applicable legislation and
customs, including amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those
customs," and that "courts must apply customary law when that law is
applicable, subject to the Constitution and [relevant] legislation . . . ."42
As Justice Langa noted in Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha, this means
that customary law "is protected by and subject to the Constitution in
its own right."43 It is no longer dependent on rules of repugnancy for
continued validity. Judge Van Der Westhuizen explained in Shilubana
v. Nwamitwa that "customary law has a status that requires respect."44
As the South African Constitutional Court held in Alexkor v.
Richtersveld Community, customary law must be recognized as an
"integral part" of the law and "an independent source of norms within
the legal system."45 The new approach as reflected in the
postdemocratization constitutions does not immunize customary law
from human rights norms. The new Kenyan Constitution provides that
[tiraditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall not be
used in a way that:
(a) contravenes the Bill of Rights;
(b) is repugnant to justice and morality or results in
outcomes that are repugnant to justice or morality; or
(c) is inconsistent with [the] Constitution or any written
law. 46
It makes clear that the Bill of Rights clauses trump customary law
norms that conflict with constitutional provisions by stating that "[a]ny
41. S. AFR. CONST., § 211(1), 1996.
42. Id. § 211(2).
43. 2004 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 1 41 (S. Afr.).
44. 2008 (2) SA 66 (CC) 1 43 (S. Afr.).
45. 2003 (5) SA 460 (CC) 51 (S. Afr.).
46. CONSTITUTION, art. 159 (3) (2010) (Kenya).
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law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this Constitution
is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in
contravention of this Constitution is invalid."47 The Kenyan
Constitution goes further than any of the other African constitutions by
providing for automatic application of international treaties to which
Kenya has acceded. 48 Article 2 (6) provides that any treaty or convention
ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under the
constitution.49 It further provides for the application of customary
international law norms to Kenya.5 0 Clearly, international human
rights norms prohibiting discrimination are applicable to Kenya.5 '
Similarly, the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi provides that
"[any law that discriminates against women on the basis of gender or
marital status shall be invalid . . . .a"52 I also obligates the government
to take legislative measures that eliminate customs and practices that
discriminate against women.5 3 In section 10(2), it further provides that
"in the application and development of . .. customary law, the relevant
organs of State shall have due regard to the principles and provisions of
this Constitution."54 Similarly, the Constitution of South Africa provides
that "[tihe courts must apply customary law when that law is
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that
specifically deals with customary law."55
A similar approach can be found in the 1985 Uganda Constitution,
which in article 33 provides that
(1) Women shall be accorded full and equal dignity of the
person to men[;]
(2) The State shall provide the facilities and
opportunities necessary to enhance the welfare of
women to enable them to realise their full potential and
advancement[;]
47. Id. art. 2(4).
48. Id. art. 2(5).
49. Id. art 2(6).
50. Article 2(5) clearly implies this by stating that general international law and
conventions entered into by Kenya apply to Kenya.
51. See id. art. 2(5). ('The general rules of international law shall form part of the law
of Kenya.")
52. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI 1995, ch. IV, art. 24(2). See also id. ch.
I, art. 5 ("Any act of government or any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of this
Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be invalid.").
53. Id. ch. IV, art. 24(2).
54. Id. ch. II, art. 10(2).
55. S. AFR. CONST., § 211(3), 1996.
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(3) The State shall protect women and their rights,
taking into account their unique status and natural
maternal functions in society[;]
(4) Women shall have the right to equal treatment with
men and that right shall include equal opportunities in
political, economic and social activities[;]
(5) Without prejudice to article 32 of this Constitution,
women shall have the right to affirmative action for the
purpose of redressing the imbalances created by history,
tradition or custom[; and]
(6) Laws, cultures, customs or traditions which are
against the dignity, welfare or interest of women or
which undermine their status, are prohibited by this
Constitution. 56
The fundamental human rights provision of the Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana guarantees the cultural rights and practices of the
people, while still prohibiting "[a]ll customary practices that
dehumanize or are injurious to the physical or mental well-being of a
person."57 The modern approach is informed by the development of
international human rights norms that outlaw discrimination. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights unequivocally prohibits
discrimination.5 8 Similarly, several major international conventions
prohibit discrimination on grounds of gender. These include: the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW),59 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,60 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights,61 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination. 62 Similar norms are expressed in regional treaties such
56. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA 1995, ch. 4, art. 33.
57. CONSTITUTION OF GHANA 1992, ch. 5, art. 26.
58. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 7, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
59. CEDAW, supra note 6.
60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
61. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
62. G. A. Res. 2106 (XX) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2106(XX) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
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as the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights,63 the European
Convention on Human Rights,64 and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights. In the context of Africa, these have been followed by a
regional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
on the Rights of Women in Africa.65 In addition some of the subregional
organizations have adopted regional instruments. For example, in 2008,
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted the
Protocol on Gender and Development.6 6 The conventions, especially
CEDAW, impose positive obligations on states to pursue policies of
eliminating discrimination against women by adopting legislative and
other measures which prohibit discrimination against women. 67 The fact
that the postdemocratization constitutions do not immunize customary
law against scrutiny based on human rights norms is very significant
for women's rights because customary law embodies and underpins
customs and traditions that discriminate against women. The
discrimination of women is rooted in inequality, male domination,
poverty, aggression, misogyny, and entrenched customs and myths. The
real solution to the problem is eradication of customs that undermine
the dignity of women. The Beijing Declaration called on state parties to
ensure that "[a]ny harmful aspect of certain traditional, customary or
modern practices that violates the rights of women . . . [is] prohibited
and eliminated."68 That is why it is so important that both the
postdemocratization national constitutions and the international
conventions impose positive obligations on states to eradicate customs
and traditions that undermine the dignity and rights of women. This
can, however, only be achieved if judges take up the challenge and
interpret both the constitutional provisions and the conventions in a
manner that shows sensitivity to the objectives of the norms contained
in those documents.
63. Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18,
1978).
64. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
65. Protocol on Rights of Women, supra note 11.
66. Press Release, Southern African Development Community (SADC), SADC Heads of
State and Government Sign the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (August
2008), available at http://www.safaids.net/content/sade-heads-state-and-government-sign-
sadc-protocol-gender-and-development (click "Mediate Release on the SADC Gender
Protocol.doc"); SADC, Protocol on Gender and Development, Aug. 17, 2008, available at
www.sadc.int/attachment/download/file/247.
67. E.g., CEDAW, supra note 6, art. 2(b)-(c).
68. Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing Declaration and
Platform on Action T 224, in Report on the Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995), available at http://www.un.orglesalgopher-data/confl
fwcw/offla--20.en.
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III. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW
For decades, decisions by African courts took a static view of
customary law and did little to mitigate its discriminatory operation
against women.69 This was especially true in countries where
constitutions recognized the application of customary law without
resolving the conflict between it and human rights provisions. Judges
interpreted this situation as permitting the application of provisions of
customary law that discriminated against women. Courts failed to take
into account the fact that customary law is dynamic and ignored the
living law that was being practiced by the communities. Customary law
is continually evolving in the light of social, economic, scientific, and
technological developments and possibilities. The failure to take into
account that customary law is dynamic has changed in the majority of
jurisdictions. Judges are increasingly asserting the supremacy of human
rights norms and declaring customary discriminatory norms
unconstitutional or invalid and inapplicable in modern society. In
several jurisdictions, courts are responding to the need for change and
are showing an understanding of the existing social and economic
conditions.
In the Nigerian case of Muojekwu v. Ejikeme, the Nigerian Court of
Appeal examined a custom at issue in the context of several provisions
of the constitution.70 The court considered the Nrachi custom of Nnewi
that "enable[d] a man to keep one of his daughters unmarried
perpetually under his roof to raise issues, more especially males, to
succeed him. With the custom performed on a daughter, she takes the
position of a man in the father's house."71 The court of appeal held that
the custom was discriminatory and therefore inapplicable. 72 It was held
to be against the dictates of equity and good conscience, and it was also
held to be a violation of CEDAW.73 It was further held to be inconsistent
69. See John W. Van Doren, Death African Style: The Case of S.M. Otieno, 36 AM. J.
COMP. L. 329 (1988); Muna Ndulo, Widows under Zambian Customary Law and the
Response of the Courts, 18 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 90 (1985).
70. [2000] 5 NWLR 402 (Nigeria).
71. Id. at 406.
72. Id. at 406-07.
73. Id. at 407. Article 5 of CEDAW requires state parties to take appropriate measures
"[tlo modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women ... [and] [tio ensure that family education includes
a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the
common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their
children . . . ." CEDAW, supra note 6.
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with public policy and as being repugnant to natural justice.74 Noting
the failure of the legislature to outlaw the practice through legislation,
the court expressed the view that in such situations it was up to courts
to do something about it.75 Justice Olagunju stated:
since the abrogation of such obnoxious practice rests
absolutely with the legislature of the state that still
clings to such absurdity and the burden of containing
the incidence of its manifestations in judicial matters
lies upon the apex court the best that can be done at this
level of judicial hierarchy is to shun the practice as
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience
and, therefore, unenforceable, hoping that sooner than
later the authorities that are in a position to do so will
hasten the interment of a custom that has outlived its
usefulness and has become counter-productive. 76
Quoting an earlier related case,77 Justice Fabiyi added, "All human
beings-male and female-are born into a free world and are expected
to participate freely without any discrimination on grounds of sex, and
that is constitutional."78
In Edet v. Essien, a Nigerian court considered a customary rule in
which, if a woman's dowry was not refunded to her former husband,
children born by a subsequent marriage belonged to the husband of the
first marriage.79 The court held that the custom was contrary to natural
justice, equity, and good conscience.80 The court ruled that a custom
that denies the natural or biological father of his child is certainly
repugnant to natural justice.81
In Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha, Shibi v. Sithole, and South
African Human Rights Commission v. President of the Republic of South
Africa, the South African Constitutional Court consolidated three cases,
and took up the "constitutional validity of the principle of primogeniture
in the context of the customary law of succession."82 Central to the
customary law of succession is the principle of male primogeniture.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 408.
76. Id.
77. Mojekwu v. Mojekwu, [1997] 7 NWLR 283; discussed infra pages 105-06.
78. Id. at 409.
79. [1932] 11 NLR 47.
80. Id. at 48.
81. Id.
82. 2004 (1) SA 580 (CC) 1 3 (S. Afr.).
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These were three cases brought to the Constitutional Court at the same
time. In Bhe, two minor daughters were ineligible to inherit from their
father's intestate estate.83 Under section 33 of the Black Administration
Act 38 of 1927 and regulation 2(e) of the Administration and
Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks, minor children are not
entitled to inherit intestate from their father's estate." The estate thus
devolved to the deceased's father, who was named sole heir and
successor.85 Among other sections, section 23(2) and regulation 2(e) were
challenged in the high court, where both sections were ruled
unconstitutional. 86
In Shibi, Ms. Shibi, the applicant and deceased's sister, was
ineligible to become heir of the deceased's intestate estate,
notwithstanding the fact that the deceased had neither a civil nor
customary law wife, was childless, and did not have surviving parents
or grandparents.87 This was the result of the application of section 23 of
the Black Administration Act, and regulation 2(e) in particular,
requiring devolution of an African's estate to be made according to
custom. 88 One of the deceased's male cousins was named the rightful
representative of the estate, with a second male cousin designated as
the sole heir of the deceased's intestate estate.89 In the high court, Ms.
Shibi was granted a declaratory order pronouncing her as sole heir in
her deceased brother's estate.90
The third case was an application by the South African Human
Rights Commission and the Women's Legal Center Trust. These
organizations had applied to the high court for the constitutional
invalidation of section 23 of the Act, which allowed the application of the
offending customary norm. Before the case was heard, the Bhe case was
referred to the Constitutional Court. Rather than proceed in the high
court, the South African Human Rights Commission and the Women's
Legal Centre Trust sought direct access to the Constitutional Court to
have section 23 of the Act-or in the alternative subsections (1), (2), and
(6) of section 23-declared inconsistent with the Constitution of South
Africa, in particular the equality provisions (section 9), the right to
human dignity (section 10), and the rights of children (section 28).91 The
application was granted.




87. Id. 11 21-25.
88. Id. 1 22.
89. Id. 1 23-24.
90. Id. TT 27.
91. Id. 11 7, 31.
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The Constitutional Court declared section 23 and its associated
regulations to be discriminatory on the grounds of race, sex, and gender,
and thus contrary to section 9(3) of the South African Constitution. 92
The court further held that the section was also contrary to the right to
dignity.93 In so far as it precluded minors and extramarital children
from inheriting, the regime violated the rights of children (section 28) in
the constitution in that it subjected children to unfair discrimination on
the basis of sex and birth.94 The court found that the serious violations
of these rights were not justifiable in terms of the section 36 and
therefore the court struck down section 23 pursuant to section 172(1)(a)
of the constitution.95
In the absence of section 23, the Constitutional Court held that the
customary law of succession applied to all three cases, and in contention
was the rule of primogeniture.96 In so far as the rule excluded women
from inheritance on the grounds of gender, it violated section 9(3) of the
South African Constitution.97 It also violated the right of women to
human dignity secured by section 10 of the constitution.98 Furthermore,
the rule of primogeniture was held to be discriminatory insofar as it
hindered all female children, and male extramarital children, from
inheriting.99 Based on this analysis, the court ruled in the Bhe case that
the minor daughters, Nonkululeko Bhe and Anelisa Bhe, were to be the
sole heirs of the estate. 00 In the Shibi case, the Court ruled that
Charlotte Shibi, the only sister of the deceased, was to be the sole heir of
the deceased's estate.' 0
In the Nigerian case Mojekwu v. Mojekwu, under the Nnewi custom,
if a man dies leaving male issue, the male child inherits the deceased's
property.102 However, if the man leaves no male issue, the man's brother
will inherit his property. If the male issue who survives the father dies,
leaving no male issue, the father's brother inherits the property, and on
it goes along the male line only. In this case, the son of the deceased's
late brother inherited the property of his relation to the exclusion of the
daughter of the deceased. 03 The Nigerian Court of Appeal found the
92. Id. 1 68, 91-93.
93. Id. 95.
94. Id. TT 52-54.





100. Id. I 136(11)(a)(i).
101. Id. 136(11)(b)(i).
102. [1997] 7 NWLR 283.
103. Id.
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Nigerian custom that effectively prevented female family members from
inheriting property repugnant to the principles of natural justice,
equity, and good conscience. 104 The court held that all human beings
"are born into a free world and are expected to participate freely,
without any discrimination on grounds of sex."105 In the opinion, Justice
Tobi noted,
Any form of societal inhibition on grounds of sex, apart
from being unconstitutional, is antithesis to a society
built on the tenets of democracy which we have freely
chosen as a people. . . . Accordingly, for a custom or
customary law to discriminate against a particular sex is
to say the least an affront on the Almighty God Himself.
Let nobody do such a thing. On my part, I have no
difficulty in holding that the 'Oli-Ekpe' custom of Nnewi
is repugnant to natural justice, equity and good
conscience.106
In the Kenyan case of In re the Estate of Andrew Manunzyu
Musyoka,107 the deceased died intestate. The application was brought by
the deceased's daughter, born of his first customary law marriage. The
application was in response to the filing of letters of administration by
the deceased's sons and wife, to the effect that they were the
beneficiaries of the deceased's estate. The applicant daughter alleged
that she was also entitled to inherit from the deceased's father's estate.
This assertion was met with counterargument from the respondents
that application of African customary law stood to exclude her from
inheriting. The customary law rule of the Kamba people is that a female
married under African customary law is ineligible to inherit from the
estate of her deceased father. The daughter may regain eligibility to
inherit, however, if on divorce the mbui sya ulee (goats) are returned by
the woman to the husband. On finding that no customary marriage had
in fact been concluded, the court held that the applicant was entitled to
inherit, and that her name was to be added to the filings. The court held
that Kamba customary law was discriminatory in so far as it sought to
deny the applicant her inheritance rights on grounds of sex. The law
was repugnant to justice and good morals and therefore inapplicable to
the case. In making its determination, the court used the Succession
104. Id.
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Act, which governs intestate succession generally. 08 Section 3(2) of the
Succession Act provides that if a party to a matter is subject to or
affected by African customary law, then the courts are to apply that law
so long as it is "not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent
with any written law and shall decide all such cases according to
substantial justice."109 Finding that Kamba customary law was
applicable to the case at hand, the court noted that the customary law
rule under consideration precludes a married daughter from inheriting
from her deceased father's estate. The court held that Kamba customary
law discriminated on the basis of sex, and compared this custom to
section 40(1) of the Succession Act, which contains a gender-neutral
provision for intestate succession in the case of polygamous
marriages.110 In terms of section 40(1), the court pronounced on the
applicant's eligibility to inherit, stating that unless she opted out of a
share of her father's estate, she was entitled to inherit."'
Turning to the constitution, the court noted that section 82(4) of the
constitution provides an exception to the general protection afforded by
the section 82(1) nondiscrimination provision. The relevant exception,
contained in section 82(4)(c), provides that the constitutional
nondiscrimination provision does not apply to the application of
customary law.112 Notwithstanding this constitutional exception, the
court went on to say that Kenya, as signatory to a number of
international conventions and regional agreements-the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
CEDAW, and the African Charter of Human Rights and Peoples'
Rights-was under an obligation to observe the doctrines of
antidiscrimination contained therein. The court buttressed this point by
noting that "[i]nternational law is applicable in Kenya as part of our law
so long as it is not in conflict with the existing law even without specific
legislation adopting [it]."113 The court accepted as precedent the case of
Mary Rono v. Jane Rono and William Rono in which international law
instruments were used to nullify a discriminatory succession norm.114
The court thus endorsed the use of international law in instances of
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case of Estate of Mutio Ikonyo v. Peter Mutua Ngui as an instance in
which customary law rule was applied.116 In that case, the court held
that because the applicant was a married woman, she was not entitled
to inherit from the deceased's estate.117 The judge held that the Estate of
Mutio Ikonyo decision was not binding on the court, and the court
disagreed with its holding, especially in light of the court of appeal
decision in the Mary Rono case.118
In Ephraim v. Pastory,"i9 the High Court of Tanzania considered a
law where, although daughters were entitled to inherit family land,
unlike men, they could not dispose of the land. 120 The court held this
rule to be discriminatory and inconsistent with the Tanzanian Bill of
Rights, which prohibits discrimination against any person.121 The court
further noted that the constitution's incorporation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Tanzania's ratification of
CEDAW, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights all required
Tanzania to prohibit discrimination based on sex.122
In Ghana, faced with similar problems, the courts have shown
flexibility and readiness to nullify customary norms that discriminate
against women. Ghanaian courts have, for instance, ruled that the
successor's title is subject to the widow's right to the home, her right to
all the household goods enjoyed in common with the deceased in the
matrimonial home, and the right of the widow and children to
maintenance out of the estate. 123 In Akrofi v. Akrofi, the plaintiff was
the only child of the deceased and sought an order from the court
declaring her as the sole successor to her deceased father's estate.124
This action arose from the fact that the deceased's brother had been
appointed heir to the deceased's estate. Succession to property in Buem
is patrilineal, and male children take preference over female children.
However, in the absence of any male children, female children are not
precluded from inheriting and are, in the language of the court, "within
the range of persons entitled to succeed." 125 The court found that a




119. (2001) AHRLR 236 2 (reprinting (1990) LRC (Const.) 757).




124. [1965] G.L.R. 13, 14 (Ghana).
125. Id. at 16.
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that even if such a custom did exist, that custom had outlived its
usefulness and was no longer not in conformity with public policy. 126
Respect for the law can only be achieved if the law furthers the
needs and conforms to the circumstances of society subject to the law.
Failure to use the law to achieve just social solutions to issues
confronting society and to reform society effectively thwarts
development and advancement in customary law and consequently also
reduces respect for it. As the Ghana High Court in In re Appiah (Decd.),
faced with a customary norm that excluded children and vested
inheritance in a successor to the deceased, observed,
I must mention that the impact of social and economic
changes on this aspect of customary law is to recognise
the widows [sic] and the children [sic] of the intestate
husband right to personal chattels enjoyed in common
with the deceased in the matrimonial home. Such items
include beds, beddings, private cars, etc. For it is
unreasonable and therefore uncustomary to deprive
them of the use and enjoyment of things they have been
brought up with and gotten used to.127
The scope of the rights of women to own and dispose of real property is
an ongoing human rights issue in a number of countries.
For decades decisions by African courts took a static view of
customary law and did not try to mitigate the operation of the
discriminatory customary law norms that discriminated against women.
This is changing; empowered by postdemocratization constitutions,
many courts have taken up the challenge. Hotel Intercontinental v.
Longwel28 in Zambia and Attorney General v. Unity Dow129 in Botswana
were trailblazers in the SADC region. More recent examples that have
carried the struggle of establishing a society where men and women are
equal to a higher level are the Bhe case, in which the South African
Constitutional Court took up the constitutional validity of the principle
of primogeniture in the context of the customary law of succession.130
Later, in Shilubana v. Nwamitwa, the South African Constitutional
126. Id.
127. In re Appiah (Decd.), [19751 G.L.R. 465, 473; see also Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo
[1974] G.L.R. 110; In re Kofi Antubam (Decd.) [1965] G.L.R. 138.
128. Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels, (1993) 4 L.R.C. 221 [SC] (Zam.) (holding
discriminatory a hotel practice of refusing entry to unaccompanied women to the hotel
premises).
129. (1992) AHRLR 99, 49 (Bots.).
130. See discussion of the Bhe case, supra pages 103-05.
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Court addressed whether a community has the authority to restore the
position of traditional leadership-which has been removed because of
gender discrimination-to a house.13' As the South African
Constitutional Court observed in Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and
Security, the constitution imposes an obligation on the courts to shape
the common law and customary law such that it adheres to the
principles of the South African Constitution.132 We can only hope that
African courts will provide more of these kinds of decisions.
Unfortunately, there are still a number of jurisdictions where courts
continue to reject the reformist approach and insist that legislation is
required to change the offending customary law norms. The Zimbabwe
Supreme Court case of Magaya v. Magaya illustrates this view. 33
Magaya, the deceased, died intestate. A community court initially
named the deceased's eldest child (the only and female child of the
deceased's first customary law wife) the heir of his estate. On appeal,
however, this order was set aside, and the secondborn son of the
deceased's second customary law wife was declared the heir (the
firstborn son of this second marriage having declined to be declared
heir). On further appeal to the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, the decision
declaring the male child the heir was upheld. The court reasoned that
under the customary law of succession males are preferred to females as
heirs. The court stated that the Constitution of Zimbabwe, while
containing antidiscrimination provisions in sections 23(1) and (2), does
not explicitly prohibit discrimination on grounds of sex or gender. It
expressed the view that section 23(3) of the constitution exempts certain
discriminatory behavior. Notably, any law that relates to matters
concerning marriage, adoption, divorce, burial, devolution of property on
death, or other matters of personal law, and the application of African
customary law will be exempt from the section 23(1) prohibitions.
The court further argued that African customary law is
constitutionally sanctioned under section 89 of the constitution, and
some would elevate this right to a right having been conferred by the
constitution. While acknowledging the importance of gender
advancement, the court argued that the fact that customary law is a
long-standing, fundamental, and central aspect of African society means
that it cannot easily be discarded. Furthermore, the application of
customary law is voluntary in the sense that it applies only to those
"who choose to marry under customary law or choose to be bound by
it."134 It reasoned that the matter at hand concerned not only an issue of
131. 2009 (2) SA 66 1 1 (CC).
132. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) 33-36.
133. [1999] 1 ZLR 100 (Zim.).
134. Id.
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devolution of property on death, but also concerned an application of
African customary law in the context of inheritance and succession of
the estate of an African, who was party to customary law marriages and
therefore the case fell within the sanctuary afforded by section 23(3) of
the Zimbabwe Constitution. The court concluded that given the
complexity of issues arising from the clash between African customary
laws on inheritance and succession and non-discrimination provisions,
any reform in this area should be left to the legislative machinery. To
argue that if a particular society has always had discriminatory
practices it should stay that way, as the court seems to say, is to accept
an extreme form of moral and legal positivism.
In deciding as it did, the court completely ignored the policy
arguments applicable to the situation and the fact that Zimbabwe is a
party to several human rights conventions, including the CEDAW,
which speaks directly to the issue the court was addressing and which
expressly prohibits sex discrimination. As the Botswana High Court
observed in the case of Attorney-General v. Dow, custom and tradition
have always yielded to express legislation . . . . A
constitutional guarantee cannot be overridden by custom.
Of course, the custom, will as far as possible be read so as to
conform to the constitution. But where this is impossible, it
is custom not the constitution which must go.135
In the end, the court upheld a customary law that gave preference to
males over females as heirs. A daughter was excluded from inheriting
her father's estate under the laws of her community regardless of birth
order. This was so because she had certain obligations to her marital
family that would conflict with any obligations she might have to her
original family as the heir of that estate. Holding this principle as
higher in complete disregard of positive laws prohibiting discrimination
based on sex is inexcusable.
This approach also departs from the true common law method,
which has always been pragmatic. As William Church has observed,
[u]nity, simplicity and preservation of the past are not the
only attributes of a sound legal system. Thus
concentration on these goals to the exclusion of all others
pulls the law away from its more immediate, and more
135. (1992) AHRLR 99, 1 49 (Bots.).
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important function as a fluid, pragmatic crucible in which
society's problems are tested, debated and resolved. 136
In the true common law tradition, the inherent flexibility of the common
law means that the common law as a procedural system contains its
own internal repugnancy clause. The internal repugnancy clause resides
in the judicial discretion to overrule precedents and refuse to follow
established common law rules in certain circumstances. As Justice
Sutherland stated in Funk v. United States, "the common law is not
immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to
varying conditions."137 In outlining a reason for a common law rule,
Chief Justice Black in the Pennsylvania case of McDowell v. Oyer
stated,
[a] palpable mistake, violating justice, reason, and law,
must be corrected, no matter by whom it may have been
made. There are cases in our books which bear such
marks of haste and inattention, that they demand
reconsideration. There are some which must be
disregarded, because they cannot be reconciled with
others. There are old decisions of which the authority
has become obsolete, by a total alteration in the
circumstances of the country and the progress of
opinion. Tempora mutatur. We change with the change
of the times, as necessarily as we move with the motion
of the earth.138
A notable use of the common law's ability to declare a rule
repugnant is the House of Lord's 1991 decision in Regina v. R.,
overturning the common law rule that a husband cannot be found guilty
of raping his wife. 39 The basis of this "marital exception" was that the
marriage contract contained an irrevocable consent to sexual
intercourse. Lord Keith of Kinkel stated that the common law could
evolve "in the light of changing social, economic and cultural
developments."140 The House of Lords rested its decision to destroy the
rule on notions of equality between sexes, and the standards of modern
society derived from social, economic, and social developments.
136. William Church, The Common Law and Zambia, in LAW IN ZAMBIA, supra note 13,
at 1, 26.
137. 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933).
138. 21 Pa. 417, 423 (1853).
139. [19911 1 A.C. 599 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K).
140. Id. at 616.
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Similarly, the South African Constitutional Court observed that the
constitution "imposes an obligation on the courts to consider whether
there is a need to develop the common law to bring it into line with the
Constitution, and to develop it if so. The same is true of customary
law."141 The South African Constitutional Court considered the
obligation of South African courts to develop the common law and held
that "where the common law deviates from the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights the courts have an obligation to develop it by
removing that deviation."142 As Judge Ngcobo observed, this principle
applies to the development of indigenous law as well. 143 "Where a rule of
indigenous law deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
of Rights, courts have an obligation to develop it so as to remove such
deviation."144 This would mean modifying the parts of the custom that
are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.
In Shilubana v. Nwamitwa, Judge Van Der Westhuizen explained
that customary law "[1]ike the common law . . . is adaptive by its very
nature. By definition, then, while change annihilates custom as a source
of law, change is intrinsic to and can be invigorating of customary
law."145
Another factor supportive of a dynamic interpretation of the concept
of African tradition is the requirement by the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights in article 60 that the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights
shall draw inspiration from international law on human
and peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of
various African instruments on human and peoples'
rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of
the Organization of African Unity, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments
adopted by the United Nations . . . as well as from the
provisions of various instruments adopted within the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of which the
parties to the present Charter are members.146
141. 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) 1 48 (citing Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4)
SA 938 (CC) 11 34-36.)
142. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) 33.
143. Bhe 2004 (1) SA 580 (CC) 215 (Ngcobo, J., concurring).
144. Id.
145. 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) T 54.
146. African Charter, supra note 10.
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The recently established African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights has wide substantive jurisdiction-wider in fact than any of the
existing regional courts in that its jurisdiction extends to all cases and
disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of
the Charter, the Protocol, and any relevant human rights instrument
ratified by the states concerned. Article 7 of the Protocol provides that
"[t]he Court shall apply the provisions of the Charter and any other
relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned." 147
In effect, the fact that the African Charter embraces all spheres of
human rights-political and civil, as well as social and economic
rights-represents the most authoritative rendering of the African
tradition in the field of human rights.
IV. REFORMING CUSTOMARY LAW: COMPLEMENTING THE WORK OF THE
COURTS
A fundamental question that remains is how do we complement the
work of the courts and advance the project of reforming African
customary law so that norms that discriminate against women can be
eradicated. The task of reform is too large to be left to the courts alone,
and courts are handicapped in that they can only deal with issues that
arise in cases brought before them. A strategy is needed because
opposition to reform by those who benefit most from maintaining the
customary system, as well as from political players, should not be
underestimated.
Reform of customary law can be divided into four approaches. The
first approach is to encourage all African countries to join international
and regional human rights instruments and the enforcement
mechanisms that the systems have put in place, such as the African
Court of Human and Peoples' Rights. Further, African countries should
be encouraged to develop subregional enforcement mechanisms. This
will result in a comprehensive system of norm setting and enforcement
mechanism instruments and will lay a foundational framework within
which women's rights can be articulated and protected together with
other human rights. The second approach is to ensure that human
rights instruments are reflected in national constitutions and national
legislation. All African national constitutions should outlaw all forms of
discrimination and none of them should immunize customary law
against human rights provisions. If the goal of complete equality
147. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 9, 1998,
O.A.U. Doc. CABILEG/665 (entered into force January 1, 2004).
114
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW, CUSTOMS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 115
between men and women in all legal, political, and social arrangements
and, the goal of the Beijing Conference-to remove all obstacles to
women's active participation in all spheres of public life and private life
through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural, and political
decision making148-are to be achieved, African constitutions must be
rid of the provisions that derogate from the application of the equality
and antidiscriminatory provisions on the grounds of customary law.
There is need for constitutional provisions that declare the rights of
women and reaffirm their equality with men in all respects. The guiding
principle should be the equality of all human beings regardless of sex
and gender differences.
The third major approach should be focused on legal reform of both
customary law and ordinary legislation in all African countries to rid
them of gender discriminatory laws. Reform efforts should start with a
comprehensive diagnostic study of each African country's legal system
aimed at identifying laws that require reform. Any reform project must
begin with the underlying task of figuring out which laws are in conflict
with human rights norms of equality and nondiscrimination. With
respect to customary law, any reform effort must be mindful of the
weapons of the traditionalists who argue that human rights norms are
the product of Euro-Christian societies. Reformers must assure the
public that the human rights project is not about westernizing African
societies, but on the contrary, is an attempt to integrate the traditional
and modern values of the African people with the concepts of human
rights and dignity for all persons. In order to counter the criticism that
human rights is a Western project, the values of the customary law
should be studied so that important and nondiscriminatory parts are
preserved and included in the legal reform, but without discrimination
against women. As Fatima Babikar Mahmoud has observed "There are
positive and negative elements in every culture and in every religion. It
is important to remain open and critical of ourselves ....
In the judgment of the South African Constitutional Court in
Shilubana v. Nwamitwa, Judge Van Der Westhuizen listed four useful
guidelines for how to approach the reform of customary law.150 The case
before the court was an appeal against a court of appeal judgment
confirming a decision of the high court, in which "[a] woman was
appointed to a chieftainship position for which she was previously
disqualified by virtue of her gender."15 '
148. Fourth World Conference on Women, supra note 68, $$ 22-30.
149. Fatima Babikar Mahmoud, Are Human Rights Universal? Issues of Gender and
Culture, AFRICA NOTES, May-June 2004.
150. 2008 (2) SA 66 (CC) 44-49.
151. Id. $$ 1-2.
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Th[e] Court [was] called on to decide whether the
community [had] the authority to restore the position of
traditional leadership to the house from which it was
removed by reason of gender discrimination, even if this
discrimination occurred prior to the coming into
operation of the Constitution.152
Judge Van Der Westhuizen stated four factors that ought to be
considered in determining the content of a customary norm: (1) the
traditions of the community concerned; (2) the possible distortion of
records due to the colonial experience; (3) the need to allow communities
to develop customary norms; and (4) the fact that customary law, like
any other law, regulates the lives of people. 153 Customary norms have
developed over a period of time, and an inquiry into a norm should
involve "consideration of the past practice of the community."154 The
court emphasizes that this should be done in customary law's "own
setting rather than in terms of the common law paradigm."15 5 The lives
and conditions of the people are forever changing as they are embedded
in new social and economic conditions. This means that the "need for
flexibility and the imperative to facilitate development must be
balanced against the value of legal certainty, respect for vested rights,
and the protection of constitutional rights." 5 6
It should be noted that the descriptions of customary law recorded
in books were invariably made by men thought to be knowledgeable
about custom. In this case, the court held that the customary rule that
chieftainship is passed down to the eldest son is out of step with
society's new norms that men and women are equal.157 The court
concluded that the contemporary practice of the Valoyi community
reflected a valid change of custom.158 As Judge Van Der Westhuizen
observed, customary law must be permitted to develop.
The legal status of customary law norms cannot depend
simply on their having been consistently applied in the
past, because that is a test which any new development
must necessarily fail. Development implies some
departure from past practices. A rule that requires
152. Id. 1 2.
153. Id. 11 44-49.
154. Id. 44.
155. Id.
156. Id. 1 47.
157. Id. 1 43.
158. Id. T 86.
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absolute consistency with past practice before a court
will recognise the existence of a customary norm would
therefore prevent the recognition of new developments
as customary law. This would result in the courts
applying laws which communities themselves no longer
follow, and would stifle the recognition of the new rules
adopted by the communities in response to the changing
face of South African society. 59
However, it is important, as Judge Ngcobo has observed, "[w]hen
dealing with indigenous law every attempt should be made to avoid the
tendency of construing indigenous law concepts in the light of common
law concepts or concepts foreign to indigenous law."16o There are obvious
dangers in using common law concepts to analyze African customary
law. Legal norms develop in different situations under different cultures
and in response to different conditions.
It is understandable that there is much nostalgia about African
customary law among African people. Customary law is, after all, part
of African identity. However, we should not ignore the structural
limitations to adapt customary norms to changing circumstances
imposed by the nature of the social-economic and political system that
existed under colonial rule and contributed to the distortion of
customary norms. Africans played a very limited and negligible role in
governance and the formulation of laws that governed them. We must
also not forget that equality is related to the right to dignity. Following
the historical experiences of slavery and colonialism that African people
have endured, we should be aware of the fact that discrimination
conveys to the person discriminated against that the person is not of
equal worth. The discrimination against women conveys the message
that women are not equal to men and undermines their dignity.
The fourth approach of the project should be to take the fight for
gender equality to mass movements. There has to be a social movement
to change the view and ingrained concept that women's rights is a
Western idea that does not fit in African culture. We have to show that
human rights are not foreign to Africa. As E. E. 0. Alemika observes in
the introduction to Eze's work Human Rights and Social Justice: An
African Perspective, Africa "had ideas of human rights, and created
institutions, processes and folklore to protect and promote human
159. Id. 55.
160. Bhe 2004 (1) SA 580 (CC) 1 156 (Ngcobo, J., concurring).
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dignity within the limits of resources and knowledge available."' 6' There
has to be a strategic movement aimed at showing that women's rights is
a relevant issue now in Africa and showing that African society has
always recognized human rights norms of many types, some of which
coincide squarely with internationalized modern ones. This could go a
long way in changing the view held by some that the rights project is a
western project aimed at spreading western values. We have to ensure
that the courts interpret the law in such a way that gender equality is
advanced, and social movements should put pressure on the courts and
society to act in the interests of gender equality. Courts should be
encouraged to examine the prevailing social and cultural conditions as
well as the goals of the justice system as they decide cases. They should
be encouraged to interrogate customary law and deconstruct it to see
what values underpin particular norms. For example, the custom of
widow inheritance, where the widow is inherited by a male relative of
the late husband's family, should be interrogated to establish the core
value of the custom. Is it about marrying a widow and having a sexual
relationship with her or about providing for the welfare of the family of
the deceased? If it is the latter, surely this can be achieved without
forcing widows into marriages with a deceased's relative. Getting to the
heart of the values of customary law is a daunting task, but including
those values in a new legal system free from discrimination is the best
way to ensure stability, fairness, predictability, and equality.
Customary law, like any other law, is not static and is always changing
to reflect how people are living today. This suggests that we need to
improve access to courts so that women can bring claims litigating
discriminatory practices. This involves not only making courts and legal
services accessible and affordable to women, but also should include
educating society-men and women-about the Bill of Rights and what
rights and obligations flow from the rights articulated in the Bill of
Rights. We need to encourage gender-sensitive civic education in our
schools and communities. Legal education should target a range of
different actors, such as individuals, religious leaders, judges,
traditional rulers, and lawyers. It must also involve providing African
judges with best practices. We should encourage the exchange of human
rights jurisprudence in emerging Africa with the intention of spreading
best practices. This would involve making courts aware of other African
courts that are making decisions that advance human rights.
161. E.E.O. Alemika, Introduction to OSITA C. EZE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:
AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (Empowerment & Action Research Centre, Annual Lecture,
Series No. 4, 1998).
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CONCLUSION
Although progress is being made, there are still many jurisdictions
where much work remains to be done. There are still countries where
constitutional provisions immunize African customary norms, against
human rights scrutiny. Judges in these jurisdictions interpret these
constitutional derogation provisions as permitting the application of
provisions of customary law that discriminate against women. This is
clearly a retrogressive way of constitutional interpretation and one that
fails to take into account the country's obligations under international
conventions and regional human rights instruments. International
jurisprudence that has developed in international human rights courts,
such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European
Court of Human Rights, and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights courts, interprets international conventions as imposing
obligations on state parties to ensure that discrimination does not
happen and that it is prohibited.
In Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
held that parties to the American Convention on Human Rights shall
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized
[in the Convention] and to ensure to all persons subject
to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those
rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for
reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, economic status,
birth, or any other social condition. 162
The court held that three obligations arise from these undertakings:
(1) respect the rights and freedoms recognized by the Convention,16 3 (2)
ensure the free and full exercise of the rights recognized in the
Convention to every person subject to its jurisdiction, 164 and (3)
investigate acts that violate an individual's rights. 65 "An illegal act
which violates human rights and which is initially not directly
imputable to a State . . . can lead to international responsibility of the
State, not because of the act itself,"166 but because it failed to prevent
the violations when it could have done so. The court stated that "what
162. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4
161 (July 29, 1988).
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[was] decisive was whether a violation of the rights recognized by the
Convention has occurred with the support or the acquiescence of the
government, or whether the State allowed the act to take place without
taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible." 67
In A. v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights
explained that state parties must protect the human rights of their
inhabitants from violation by others, including by private parties
subject to the state's jurisdiction or authority.168 Similarly the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has stated that
internationally accepted ideas of the various obligations
engendered by human rights indicate that all
rights-both civil and political rights and social and
economic-generate [a number] of duties for a State that
undertakes to adhere to a rights regime .... [T]he State
is obliged to protect right-holders against other subjects
by legislation . . .. [The State must] move its machinery
[to protect beneficiaries of the protected rights] towards
actual realisation of the rights.169
African governments know the discriminatory nature of certain
African customary law norms and are therefore complicit in the
violation of women's rights.
But as the South African Constitutional Court observed in the Bhe
case with respect to the customary law of succession, we cannot leave
the customary law of succession, or others areas of the law, to develop in
a piecemeal and sometimes slow fashion, since this would provide
inadequate protection to women and children. In this respect
constitutional provisions should declare that women have equal rights
with men in the enjoyment of all rights and freedoms and the
derogations on account of customary law should be eliminated. In
addition, in order to achieve equality between men and women, we will
need to transform institutions that define poverty, vulnerability, and
dependence.
167. Id. 173.
168. (No. 25599), 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. T 22.
169. Soc. & Econ. Action Rights Ctr. v. Nigeria, Judgments Afr. Comm'n on Human &
Peoples' Rights, 1 44, 46-47, ACHPR/COMM/AO44/1 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
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